

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300070037-1

CRB-00106/77
4 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Services Staff

FROM : [REDACTED]
Chief, ISS/PIAG/CRB

SUBJECT : Security Implications in the State Department
Decimal File System

REFERENCE : Your Informal Request for Information - Copy
Attached

1. On 3 August 1977 Mr. [REDACTED] DDA/ISAS/RRB, attended a meeting at State Department to discuss Security Implications in the State Department Decimal File System. Mr. [REDACTED] was advised at this meeting that the State Department had scheduled the turn-over to NARS of State Index Cards for the period 1950-1954 for December 1977. As a result of this meeting, the State Department Officers (a Mr. Macket and a Mr. Cramsy - phonetic) with whom Mr. [REDACTED] met, agreed to delay turning over the 1950-1954 index cards until a decision can be reached as to how to protect the classified information on these index cards.

2. At my request Mr. [REDACTED] Senior Review Officer in DDA/ISAS/RRB, contacted the NARS custodian of the State index cards. According to the NARS officer, there are actually three different indices: one by name; one by subject; and, one by "purport." These index cards of immediate concern to us cover the period 1945-1949 and include references to OSS, SSI, CIG, CIA and .101 (State Decimal System referring to CIA matters). There are approximately seven million (7,000,000) of these 3"x5" index cards. These cards fill 292 roller drawers (3'x3'x6").

3. Sometime ago, [REDACTED] reviewed OSS/R&A index cards filed at NARS. Based on their experience, one (1) man can process 1,800 cards per day. Accordingly, it appears that it will take 3,888 working days (approximated 17.5 man years) to complete the review of these State index cards. This review would be further complicated if NARS insisted on some type of dummy card being made for each index card removed. NARS did not require the [REDACTED] to put in dummy cards when they reviewed similar type

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cards. At that time NARS agreed to accept the index cards as they were withdrawn and place them in a special protected file area. It is possible that NARS placed dummy cards in the OSS/A&R index although we have no confirmation of that act at this time. Presumably we may be able to reach a similar agreement with NARS with the above subject index cards.

4. In spite of the magnitude of the screening job involved in reviewing these 1945-1949 index cards, it is apparent that the job must be done and within a reasonable period if we are to prevent any possible compromise [redacted] In order to accomplish the job, I suggest we consider the following possibilities:

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(a) Use existing [redacted] personnel. Decision must be made whether to add personnel to the [redacted] project in order to maintain the volume of review needed on OSS records and do the index card review at the same time. We can anticipate that the cost for each person added to the [redacted] complement will cost from \$10,000.00 to \$11,000.00.

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(b) We could seek approval to hire independent contractors under a new project. These annuitants would not need the same level of expertise required of the [redacted] group since the work involved is more routine and little or no independent decision making would be involved. This work could well be done by former intelligence assistants and analysts. Costs would be somewhat lower than that using personnel from [redacted]

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(c) Unless approval can be obtained to use independent contract personnel, consideration must be given to using staff personnel. Again, personnel at the GS-5 to GS-7 level (Intel Assistants) could be used to accomplish this review. Costs of using staff personnel would be considerably higher since full salary and other fringe benefit costs are involved. If the decision is made to use staff personnel, we can use a "task force concept" to assign and direct the activities of these staff reviewers.

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5. The above planning covers only the index cards for the period 1945-1949 and ignores the question of what to do with the State purport books containing similar information for the period 1940-1945. Considering the time period involved, it appears that we should agree that OSS officers

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ATTACHMENT

7/27/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Senior Review Officer/RRB

SUBJECT : Visit to Historical Office, State Department.

On 26 June, the C/RRB and I met with Dr. Frederick Aandahl, Assistant Chief of the State Department's Historical Office, to discuss the State Department decimal file problem. The meeting was arranged through the good offices of the C/CCS/DDO. Also in attendance at the meeting was Dr. Arthur Kogan, who was responsible for liaison with NARS, and a third staff member.

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The State Department officers were quite surprised to learn about the problem with the index and recognized the gravity of the matter. None had any positive ideas for resolving the question. They promised that they would give due deliberation to the question but did not appear unduly alarmed. They said that indexes still in State Department custody would be examined to see if similar problems existed but declared that nothing could be done concerning the indexes retired to NARS which were out of their control and open to the public. They believed that some sensitive decimal series could be identified (such as 101, State-CIA relations), but that not all sensitive cards could be located. Screening of the index was discussed but it was admitted that the task would require an enormous amount of time and personnel, which no one had. Dr. Aandahl dismissed the idea of closing the index, since the popularity of the decimal file with researchers was large enough to cause an outcry at NARS.

Dr. Kogan commented that the National Archives staff would identify and withhold CIA material located in the file but conceded that such material was not always readily identified when this fact was pointed out to him by the C/RRB. I pointed out to him that the NARS custodial staff was generally overworked on reference for this file and was neither well informed nor particularly interested in declassification review or intelligence problems and methodology. He also conceded this point. It was also conceded that the declassification unit of NARS might or might not be called upon to review the documents and the identification of CIA

sensitivities rested with the skill of the reviewers. Kogan and the others also admitted that controls on researcher access to the index were loose to non-existent.

It was the view of Dr. Kogan, and apparently Dr. Aandahl, that the problem was too large for solution. He suggested, and Dr. Aandahl seemed to concur, that the problem simply be put aside, due to the sheer bulk of the index and files (which gave the CIA-sensitive documents a measure of protection by concealment) and the fact that most researchers are interested in matters unrelated to the CIA. All conceded that there were researchers who were specifically interested in "uncovering" CIA activities overseas, particularly since several such researchers were known to them and I.

The meeting broke up amid mutual assurances of goodwill but no decisions were made and no positive steps were formulated. Later in the day, in a telephone conversation with Edwin A. Thompson (D/NND/NARS), I learned that Dr. Kogan had called him to propose a meeting of all interested parties at NARS.



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WARNING NOTICE

SOURCE, METHOD, AND MEANS OF OBTAINING SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SPEED LETTER

REPLY REQUESTED

DATE

25 July 77

X

YES

NO

LETTER NO.

TO : Mr. [REDACTED] C/ISS/DDO
ATTN: 1D-4124

FROM: [REDACTED] C/CCS/DDO, GH-44

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SUBJ: Security Implications in the State Department Decimal File System

REF: Your Memo to DDO, 1 Jun 77, Same Subj [DO/ISS #77-106]

Bill,

On 21 July 1977, I made arrangements through INR for direct contact between [REDACTED] DDA, and the State Department's Associate Historian, Fred Aandhal, to resolve the problem discussed in referent memorandum by you. I am hoping that in this way, the necessary continued protection for CIA personnel and activities can be maintained without violating the requirements on the declassification program. Unless I am informed of continuing difficulties in this area by either you or Mark, I shall forget about this item.

cc: C/ISAS/DDA

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SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

I agree with DC/ISS's suggestion on attached note. Pls try to determine how large a job this is--how much would have to be screened at NARS, not State.

D.
C/ISS

HOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
 FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

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